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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
General Supervisory Power of Federal
Courts Prohibits Federal Agents from Using
Illegally Seized Evidence in State Courts-
Petitioner was indicted under federal law for
the unlawful acquisition of marihuana, based
on evidence obtained with a search warrant
issued by a United States Commissioner.
Petitioner moved under Rule 41(e) of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to suppress the evidence
on the ground that the search warrant was im-
properly issued under Rule 41(c) in that it was
insufficient on its face, no probable cause
existed, and the affidavit was based on unsworn
statements. The District Court granted the
motion to suppress and later dismissed the
indictment. The federal narcotics agent then
swore to a complaint before a New Mexico
judge, causing a warrant for petitioner's ar-
rest to issue. While petitioner was awaiting
trial in the state court for violation of the state
narcotics law, he presented a motion in the
District Court to enjoin the federal narcotics
agent from using the illegally seized evidence
and from testifying in the state case with re-
spect to this evidence. The District Court
denied the motion and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, reversed, holding that the
agent was subject to the injunction. Rea v.
United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).
After putting aside possible constitutional
issues under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the Court stated that the case pre-
sented merely a question of the Court's super-
visory power over federal law enforcement
agencies. In support of the injunction, the
Court pointed out that the Federal Rules, pre-
scribed by it, govern the method of search and
seizure, that the power of the federal courts ex-
tends to policing those requirements and that
a federal agent cannot evade these Rules by
using the illegally acquired evidence in a state
court prosecution.
The dissent considered this case as coming
under the Fourth Amendment and indicated
that the "supervisory power over federal law
enforcement agencies" invoked by the ma-
jority was an unprecedented pronouncement.
The dissent was also unable to reconcile the
present decision with Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require state courts to
follow the federal exclusionary rule.
Convictions of Intoxication or Drunken Driv-
ing Are Not Convictions of Misdemeanors
Involving Moral Turpitude-Within a period of
fourteen months the defendant had been con-
victed of misdemeanors of driving while intoxi-
cated and disorderly conduct. Following a
subsequent apprehension by the police for
disorderly conduct, he was indicted under a
statute which made any person who had been
convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude an "habitual offender." (R.C. §
2949.34, Ohio). If convicted, he would have
been sentenced to prison for up to three years.
On a demurrer to the indictment the court
held that the offenses of intoxication and
drunken driving did not come within the pur-
view of a misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude. State v. Deer, 129 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1955).
While the statute did not define the term in
question, the court applied a definition from a
previous Ohio case which declared that a crime
involving moral turpitude is an act "denounced
by the statute (which) offends the generally
accepted moral code of mankind." Since it had
already been established that mere conviction
of a crime did not ipso facto constitute moral
turpitude, the court looked to the public policy
of the state to determine whether drunken driv-
ing offended "the generally accepted moral code
of mankind." Noting that the State of Ohio is
in the business of selling liquor and issuing
permits to others to sell it, the court concluded
that "the drinking of intoxicating liquor is not
in and of itself moral turpitude. If it [were], then
the State of Ohio is guilty of contributing to it."
This reasoning then led to the final result that
drunken driving did not involve moral turpi-
tude either.
This conclusion was buttressed by straight
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statutory construction. The court pointed out
that there were many misdemeanors which
specifically involve moral turpitude. Since the
intoxication and drunk driving provisions do
not cover this aspect, it was inferred that the
legislature must have meant to exclude it from
the moral turpitude definition.
New Trial Granted Where Juror's "Freedom
of Action" Affected by Communication He Had
Interpreted As A Bribe Offer-Three weeks
after a trial concerning the wilful evasion of
income taxes had started, one Smith, a juror in
the action, was approached by a friend of the
defendant and engaged in a conversation about
the trial. Smith was told that petitioner had
"$300,000 under the table which he daresn't
touch. Why don't you make a deal with him?"
Greatly disturbed by this communication,
Smith told the trial judge about the statement;
the judge, although dismissing the comment as
a "joke," related the incident to the FBI.
Shortly thereafter, an agent of the FBI talked
to Smith, telling the juror that he was investi-
gating the "possibility of an improper ad-
proach." The Government subsequently
dropped the matter on determining that a
criminal prosecution was unwarranted, but
never relayed this information to Smith. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction for wilful evasion of income taxes and
sent the case back for a new trial, stating that
the judgment of Smith as a juror "may have
(been) influenced and disturbed" by the preju-
dicial circumstances surrounding the trial.
Reminer v. United States, 24 U.S.L. Week 4123
(March 6, 1956).
After summarizing the evidence concerning
the statements made to juror Smith and the
acts of the FBI agent, the opinion concluded in
these words: "As he sat on the jury for the re-
mainder of the long trial and as he cast his bal-
lot, Smith was never aware of the Government's
interpretation of the events to which he ... had
become a party. He had been subjected to ex-
traneous influences to which no juror should be
subjected, for it is the law's objective to guard
jealously the sanctity of the jury's right to
operate as freely as possible from outside un-
authorized intrusions purposely made." Thus,
the Court reiterated its former attitude that
"any... tampering... with a juror during a
trial about the matter pending before the jury
is... deemed presumptively prejudicial if not
made in pursuance of known rules of the court."
Slot Machine is Still a Gambling Device
Despite the Substitution of Coin Slots and
Pay-Out Tubes with Device Permitting Oper-
ation by Remote Control-The FBI seized cer-
tain devices, known as "Trade Boosters,"
which had been shipped in interstate commerce
in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1)-(3) (1951).
These Trade Boosters permitted slot machines
to be operated by remote control after the slot
machines had been altered by having the coin
slots and certain other parts removed. The de-
vices worked in this manner: If the machine
were set at ten-cent play, "the customer would
pay the bartender one dollar, at which time
the bartender would press a button which would
register ten plays on the cabinet control box
located at the bar as well as the register located
at the slot machine..., and if the customer
pulled the lever or handle on the machine, the
plays would either be depleted or added to if
the customer had a winner, and if the customer
had a winner he would be paid in free games or
the amount in cash." The order for forfeiture
was granted, the court holding that "the Trade
Booster devices are gambling devices as defined
by 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(3) in that they are sub-
assemblies and essential parts of the gambling
devices to which they were attached and of
which they formed a part. United States v. Three
(3) Trade ,Boosters, 135 F. Supp. 24 (M.D.Pa.
1955).
The key question in this case was whether or
not the Trade Booster became an essential part
or subassembly of the slot machine in its al-
tered form. Noting that the altered slot ma-
chines could not be operated without the Trade
Boosters, the court concluded that the devices
were gambling devices. "The function of the
Trade Booster is to permit the operation of the
altered slot machine by remote control, and to
the extent to which coins and coin slots were
essential to the operation of the device prior to
19561
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its alteration the Trade Booster is essential to
its operation in its present state. The use for
which the slot machine was originally designed
and manufactured has not been changed in any
manner by the alterations made to the device."
The court rejected the argument that these
Trade Boosters were not in and of themselves
gambling device subassemblies because they
could also be used in connection with the oper-
ation of other devices. This rejection was based
primarily on the fact that the advertising liter-
ature of the manufacturer was "devoted almost
exclusively to the use of the Trade Boosters in
combination with altered slot machines."
Information Concerning Names and Ad-
dresses of Persons Paying Federal Gaming
Taxes Available to Local Prosecutors-The
Internal Revenue Code, § 6107, provides that
the district offices of the internal revenue may
furnish the prosecuting officials of any state,
county, or municipality certified copies of lists
containing the time, place and business of all
persons who have paid taxes for gaming licen-
ses. Such lists are available, as of public record,
for which a fee of $1.00 for each 100 words or
fraction thereof may be charged for the copies
requested. Usually, such a certified copy is
admissible in evidence when it is properly
proved by attaching thereto a certificate by the
Collector attesting to the copy's correctness
and authenticity. Other relevant sections are
4403, 6103(b), and 7213.
Defendant Entitled To Full Hearing Before
Sentence Where Uncontradicted Affidavit Al-
leges Juror Failed To Reveal Connection with
Law Enforcement Agency-On voir dire exam-
ination every prospective juror was asked
whether or not he had any connection with or
was a member of a law enforcement agency.
One particular juror failed to reveal that he
was actually "a member of the Civil Defense
Auxiliary Police", a group connected with a
regular police force. The defense alleged that if
this fact had been known to it, this juror would
have been excused from the trial of the robbery
charge. The Court of Appeals of New York
held that the failure of the trial court to grant
a full hearing in order to scrutinize the matter
was error; the determination of the appeal was
held up, so that the defendant might renew his
motion for a new trial. People v. Winship, 130
N.E.2d 634 (N.Y. 1955).
While it is true that false answers about in-
consequential matters do not necessarily dis-
qualify a juror, such matters must be looked
into in order to assure that the defendant's
rights have not been impaired. The Court of
Appeals then declared that since on the motion
for new trial "it was uncontroverted that the
juror did not reveal that he was a member of an
auxiliary police force, we think further proof
should be taken by affidavits or oral testimony
in order that the trial court.., and this court
shall be fully informed as to all the circum-
stances relating to the questioning on the voir
dire... ." The court said, however, that "if
the prosecution had submitted answering affi-
davits sufficient to challenge the movant's
statements at the time the trial court disposed
of the motion, the trial court might have been
justified in denying a hearing on the issues
raised thereby."
Extent of Cross-Examination Permitted
Under Statute Limiting Cross-Examination To
Matters Testified to on Direct Examination-
The defendant had been charged, as a fourth
offender, with driving while intoxicated; pre-
viously, he had been convicted as a third of-
fender and served time in the penitentiary.
During the trial he had taken the stand in his
own behalf and testified on direct only as to
matters concerning the night he was arrested.
On cross-examination he was asked if he had
been convicted of three previous offenses; over
objection of counsel the defendant was re-
quired to answer, admitting his prior convic-
tions. On appeal, following his conviction by
the jury as a fourth offender, it was contended
that this evidence was inadmissible under the
Iowa statute, IowA C.A. § 781.13 (1954),
which provided that "the state shall be strictly
confined to the matters testified to in the exam-
ination in chief." The Iowa Supreme Court,
although finding that the evidence was properly
admitted because of the failure of counsel to
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make proper objections, went on to uphold the
right of cross-examination "on any relevant
subject even under statutes such as ours." This
interpretation of the patently restrictive Iowa
statute was based on Wigmore's construction
of the nature of direct examination, which is to
the effect that "the subject of cross-examina-
tion, properly construed, is the whole fact of
guilt or innocence, and hence the topic of cross-
examination might always range over relevant
facts except those merely affecting credibility."
7 Wio ORE, EVIDENCE, § 2276(d) (3d ed. 1940).
The evidence of the prior convictions was
deemed a relevant subject and therefore ad-
missible. State v. Shepard, 73 N.W.2d 69
(Iowa 1955).
This statute was also involved in an incest
case decided the same day by the Iowa court.
In this case the cross-examination of the de-
fendant by the prosecuting attorney concerned
the basis of a separate maintenance suit, a
matter not brought out on direct. This error,
among others, required reversal of the convic-
tion for incest, the court saying that "only
when the cross-examination is so limited [to
matters testified to in the examination in chief]
may [the defendant] be required to make dis-
closures which tend to discredit or incriminate
him." State v. Leidy, 73 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 1955).
The possible conflict between these two inter-
pretations of the cross-examination statute was
summarily dismissed by the court in the
Siepard opinion. The distinction "lies in the
word 'relevant'; the cross-examination in the
Leuy case went far into irrelevant and im-
proper matters."
Where Legitimacy is in Issue the Patient-
Physician Privilege Extends to The Infant-
While in military service the plaintiff met and
courted a young French girl. Following his re-
turn to this country she came over here and the
parties were married shortly thereafter. Some
ten days after the ceremony it was discovered
that she was already pregnant; separation en-
sued. The wife then returned to France and
gave birth to a child. Plaintiff then sued for an
annulment of the marriage. In order to support
an alleged confession of these facts certain in-
terrogatories were submitted to the attending
obstetrician with respect to blood-grouping
tests and to the delivery of the child. The wife
defaulted in the action, but a special guardian
was appointed by the court to protect the in-
terests of the infant. This guardian objected to
the inquiries directed to the details of the de-
livery of the child on the ground that this dis-
closure would violate the confidential nature of
the relationship between the physician and the
infant. The Supreme Court of New York held
that the privilege arising out of the confidential
relationship of the physician and patient may
be invoked by the guardian and that, there-
fore, these proposed interrogatories will be
disallowed. Jones v. Jones, 144 N.Y.S.2d (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
The invocation of the privilege was supported
on several theories. The court reasoned that
the child on its own had become a patient of
the mother's doctor, either on the theory that
the infant was a third-party beneficiary of the
mother-doctor contract or as a principal for
whom the mother acted as agent. More broadly,
the court continued, the privilege could exist
by reason of the fact that the obstetrician did in
fact treat the child as well as the mother. The
opinion stated in support of this result that
"the infant, hopefully expected to live a happy
and secure adult life, is entitled as much to the
protection of the privilege during that life as
one who has lived his years and himself can no
longer suffer or be hurt by the disclosure." The
court concluded by allowing the blood-grouping
tests, noting that this evidence might support
the plaintiff's cause of action by itself.
Symposium on the Law of Arrest-The
Minnesota Law Review has published a three
article symposium exploring some of the recent
trends in the law of arrest. 39 MnqN. L. Rav.
473 (1955). The first article by Professor Morris
Ploscowe has raised some of the basic questions
which must be resolved before a modern law of
arrest can be formulated. He recognizes the
need for certain changes in the law of arrest
which will give police officers the powers to
make necessary arrests while at the same time
protecting the basic civil liberties of the private
1956]
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
citizens. Professor Roy Moreland addresses his
comments to substantive and procedural trends
in the law of arrest. Noting that there is a tend-
ency to overlook needed changes on the sub-
stantive side, the author first considers some of
these problems, including the question of the
use of force by an officer in effectuating an ar-
rest, and that of the reduction of the penalty
for an intentional unlawful killing from murder
to voluntary manslaughter because of provoca-
tion. However, Moreland devotes much of his
attention to the procedural trends in the law of
arrest. In particular, the author feels that there
is a noticeable tendency to question "the reason
for, and the wisdom of, the rude and hostile
manner which the police so often use toward
those other members of society with whom they
come into contact." He indicates that there is
a pattern in the profession of "being tough and
rude and overbearing" in situations that do not
demand that sort of attitude.
The final article deals with tort remedies for
police violations of individual rights. Professor
Caleb Foote initiates his discussion by refer-
ence to a rather high incidence of illegal arrest
and search which clearly invades the rights of
the affected individuals. While the traditional
tort remedies, such as recovery for false im-
prisonment and trespass for illegal search, are
still available, these remedies have become rela-
tively ineffective. They have never realized
"their deterrent potential" because of several
factors: one reason is that those who would
most likely bring such suits are of a class which
would just not bring these actions. Further-
more, the measure of damages, defenses and
evidentiary rules have imported a "dean
hands" doctrine into the traditional legal reme-
dies. However, Foote does conclude that de-
spite the obvious defects in the tort remedies
they do offer "the best hope of achieving in-
creased control over police illegality."
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